Why the Irish voted No to the Treaty of Lisbon

The significance of the Irish rejection of the Treaty of Lisbon is that it registers dissatisfaction with that treaty and the EU itself. If the treaty is to be made acceptable then intensive thought needs to be applied to secure the acceptance of Irish voters. This would not be quite such an important issue if there had been referendums in all other EU countries, but it is widely speculated that most EU states would have failed to win the acceptance of the Treaty of Lisbon by their citizens if they had been given an opportunity to express their opinions. There seems to be a very serious and widespread dissatisfaction with the treaty and if the EU is to make changes in the way it organises its institutions it would seem that to gain the support of EU citizens everywhere then changes may need to be made. The reasons for the rejection of the Treaty of Lisbon by the Irish are therefore of considerable interest.

EU leaders seem to be in denial about the lack of acceptability of their plans. They feel that it is too difficult for citizens to grasp the nature and merits of their plans and that therefore citizens must be subtly pushed into accepting them. The challenge of making acceptable reforms to the way the EU is governed was treated as a problem of presentation when the Constitution was rejected. The outcome was the changing the EU Constitution into the Treaty of Lisbon. New presentation will not solve the problem this time round. It would be unwise to ignore the challenge of radical reform of the EU (and the behaviour of its leaders).

Ireland's affection for the EU

The only member state in the European Union that has allowed its citizens to express their views in a referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon was Ireland. The referendum took place on Thursday 12 June 2008. Those voting Yes were 46.6%. Those voting No were 53.4%. The turnout was a very impressive 53%.

Support for membership of the European Union is very strong in Ireland and with good reason. (1) Fifty years ago Ireland was one of the poorest countries in Europe. Successive Irish governments embarked on economic reforms – opening up to free trade, encouraging investment, reducing taxation rates. In particular, corporation tax was reduced to 12.5 %, a major factor in attracting investment. In 1973 Ireland joined the EU and as one of its poorest members was entitled under EU rules to substantial economic aid and this was invaluable for developing infrastructure.

The Irish economy was transformed. Today Ireland is ranked as one of the ten richest countries in the world. Various measures may used to assess wealth. One is the measure of GDP per capita. This may be misleading because some of the wealth counted using this measure accrues to multinational companies who take their profits out of the country. However, if the measure is GNI (gross national income) then the World Bank's figures for 2005 suggest that the Irish are ranked seventh in the world, sixth in western Europe and third in the EU. Even so, there are wide discrepancies of income with a significant number of very poor people in Ireland (about 5%).

The case for a Yes vote

The case for a Yes vote to a new document, the Treaty of Lisbon, setting out how the EU may be governed, was hard to make. How could it be necessary to have new rules of governance if the old ones had worked well till now ( and in fact for four years after they were said to be essential)? The arguments were that the EU could not continue to work with the new situation of increased and increasing membership. The EU needed to become more “streamlined”. It needed to be able to represent itself better in the international arena. The main political parties in Ireland and the establishment campaigned for a Yes vote.

Why the Yes campaign failed

Why did they fail? There are three kinds of answer to this question. First, common sense conclusions. Second, an examination of the arguments presented by those who campaigned for a No vote. Third, explanations given by Irish voters. Of course, in any individual voter there are likely to have been a complex amalgam of reasons for the final decision.

Common sense conclusions

Leaders tend to be followed. The voices of opposition seldom come through clearly in the media. Leaders have a stamp of authority. How can those not doing the job really know what the leaders know? This leadership aura and positioning is what enables wars to be waged when most may dread the prospect and be appalled by the immorality of the proposition: leaders insist on the necessity, and the people cannot afford to take the “risk” of not following expert advice. So Irish voters made a remarkable assertion of disbelief in the EU story. It was an astonishing rejection of something presented as absolutely vital. In essence, voters did not trust the EU. They did not trust their own politicians. They did not trust the establishment.

Distrust of EU leaders

Where their distrust may have come from is a long story. A quarter of my book on the EU explores the topic in some detail. However, some immediate factors are likely to have had importance for Irish voters. First, it is obvious EU leaders themselves do not have confidence in their case. If they had confidence they would not have hesitated to put their proposal to other electorates in the EU. If they had confidence in their case they would not have spent six months intensive work re-assembling their ideas into a new document (the Treaty of Lisbon) in order to make it look like something different from the Constitution.

Second, they had kept the details of the forthcoming treaty virtually secret in the months of its development. A full consolidated text did not become available in English until the day the UK parliament first voted on the topic in January 2008. It was not available to the leaders who signed the treaty in mid December 2007. The Treaty is incomprehensible without the texts of the treaties it amends. The amending text has to be integrated into the treaties that are being amended for the concepts to be understood. Secrecy and incomprehensibility do not inspire confidence.

Third, everyone knew that this treaty was a replacement for the European Constitution that had been rejected by the Dutch and French voters. If it had been rejected by them why was it being served up in a new format? And why were Dutch and French voters not to be given an opportunity to vote on the “new” document.

Fourth, a number of EU leaders boasted that the purpose of the Treaty of Lisbon was to avoid referendums and that they had deliberately made it incomprehensible so that citizens would be unable to criticise it. (2) Who would trust people who were so blatant in their plans to confuse and deceive?

**What Irish No to Lisbon campaigners said**

The chief campaigning organisation was Libertas, organised and funded by Irish millionaire entrepreneur, Declan Ganely. The main strands of the Libertas campaign were

that the EU was too bureaucratic and imposed too much red tape that stifled business development
that the Treaty of Lisbon would reduce Irish influence/power in the European Council, the Council of Ministers and the Commission. It would weaken Irish independence/sovereignty.
The EU's free trade policies move forward partly by means of harmonising laws and there is talk of tax harmonisation. Part of Ireland's economic success has been the result of its very attractive corporation tax rate. Any risk, even in the longer term, that Irish competitive advantage here would be forcibly removed by the EU is a genuine concern for the Irish.
The EU is undemocratic. (A topic explored elsewhere on this website and at greater length in my book.)

Sinn Fein, who also campaigned for a rejection of the Treaty of Lisbon, pointed to the EU's pressure to weaken workers' rights, the pressure within the Treaty of Lisbon to bring all member states into line with an active EU military policy and arms development programme which they portrayed as a threat to Irish neutrality.

Irish farmers campaigned for a No vote as a way of protesting about how their livelihoods would be threatened by the EU's stance in trade negotiations with the World Trade Organisation. The EU Commissioner for Trade, Peter Mandelson, negotiates on behalf of all EU states and announced he would argue for a 21% reduction in EU agricultural production at the upcoming World Trade Talks. (There is no democratic mandate for this policy. Mr Mandelson acts in what he sees as the best interests of all EU states. He is not accountable to voters or individual states, or the European Parliament , or the Council of Ministers or the European Council – although he may (and does) consult with many of them and lobbyists and anyone else he chooses to speak to- and all may offer their advice on his activities.) Whilst it is difficult to see how the treaty would make this matter worse it would nevertheless be true to say that the treaty did not offer any reform that would make the appointed commissioners accountable to Irish voters or any other EU electorate.

How voters explained their decisions

Two opinion polls were conducted in Ireland very shortly after the No vote. The first was conducted by the EU – one of their Eurobarometer surveys. The second was conducted on behalf of the Irish Sunday Business Post by Red C and involved academics from Trinity College Dublin, Nottingham University, and Queens University, Belfast.

According to the Eurobarometer poll the reasons given for voting No were:

rejection of the treaty would put Ireland in a strong position to renegotiate the treaty, 76%
lack of understanding of the Treaty, 22%
loss of Irish identity, 12%
threat to Irish neutrality, distrust of politicians, loss of permanent commissioner, threats to tax system, 6%.

According to Eurobarometer, “Over half those who did not vote in the referendum said this was due to lack of understanding of the issues.”

The poll conducted for the Business Post attempted to discover the reasons for voting behaviour by an indirect approach. This involved making some assumptions about matters which were of concern to Irish voters. Two topics this poll investigated give quite a different insight from the Eurobarometer poll.

The first assumption was that Irish voters were very concerned about the large influx of immigrants which had happened largely as a result of EU membership - and in particular the dramatic 2004 EU expansion of the number of member states. Respondents were given the statement, “There should be much stricter limits on the number of foreigners coming into Ireland” and asked if they agreed with this. The difference between those who voted No and those who voted Yes were compared. Of those who voted No, 65% agreed with the statement. Those who voted Yes were less concerned with 52% agreeing with the statement. This suggests that the topic is of great concern to most Irish voters and was a significant factor in the No vote.

The statement that the signing of the Lisbon treaty would create even more unemployment was agreed with by 51% of those who voted No, compared with 14% of those who voted Yes. The idea of immigration and unemployment may be linked in the minds of many people.

What needs to be done to solve the problem of the rejected Treaty of Lisbon?

Behind EU expansion and the increasing loss of independent action for member states is the commitment in all the main EU treaties, including Lisbon, to unify Europe. Perhaps a question that should be addressed is, “How far should unification and integration be taken?” Perhaps another move is a move too far and citizens require, at least for a while, a period of stability and adjustment rather than an openness to further integration and expansion.

Any proposed changes need to be fully explained by EU politicians and full documentation nedds to be available throughout the EU well in advance of any referendum or major decision. Perhaps it would be a mark of respect for EU citizens if referendums took place throughout the EU before the signing of any new treaty or constitution or other plan for the development of the governance of the EU.

David Roberts

Author of The European Union and You, published by Saxon Books.

EU's Eurobarometer survey 13-15 June 2008 showed 98% support among Yes voters and 80% support among those who voted No.
See EU leaders spill the beans on this website.

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